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When the nominal exchange rate is fixed (it cannot be devalued),
trade liberalization would normally require a reduction in the
absolute prices of non-traded goods in order to obtain the real
depreciation needed.  This paper analyzes the difficulties in
achieving that real depreciation, and the effects of the persistent
overvaluation that may result from labor market restrictions and
capital inflows.  Issues regarding stabilization cum trade
liberalization, as well as sequencing with other reforms, are also
explored.
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     Note that in the case of these two countries, it is only the nominal exchange rate with the US dollar1
that is fixed.  As the US dollar changes in value relative to other currencies, so do the two domestic currencies.
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TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITH
A FIXED EXCHANGE RATE
by Elio Londero
To begin with, ... great depression in the export industries ... will produce an
atmosphere favourable to the reduction of wages. ... Nevertheless, ... the export industries will
not be able to reduce their prices sufficiently, until wages have fallen in the sheltered industries.
Now, wages will not fall in the sheltered industries, merely because there is unemployment in
the unsheltered industries.  Therefore, you will have to see to it that there is unemployment in
the sheltered industries also.... 
We ought to warn you, though perhaps this is going a little outside our proper sphere,
that it will not be safe politically to admit that you are intensifying unemployment deliberately
in order to reduce wages.  Thus you will have to ascribe what is happening to every conceivable
cause except the true one."
      J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill
1. Introduction
A permanent reduction in used (non-redundant) protection will typically require, ceteris
paribus, a real depreciation of the exchange rate, i.e. an increase in the prices of traded goods
relative to those of non-traded ones in order to restore equilibrium to the balance of
payments.  The real depreciation will induce the additional exports and the import
substitution needed to compensate for the additional imports generated by the reduction in
protection.  It is generally understood that such process takes place primarily through a
devaluation of the domestic currency, i.e., an increase in the nominal exchange rate e
(domestic pesos per unit of foreign exchange), accompanied by appropriate macroeconomic
policies.
However, there are other manners of attaining a real depreciation.  In some countries
the nominal exchange rate is fixed, because it is the desire of the policy-maker (Argentina
under the convertibility plan) or because foreign currency actually constitutes domestic
currency (Panama).   In those cases, a reduction in the prices of non-traded goods, or a1
domestic inflation lower than the international, will have to be attained in order to obtain the
same relative price effect of an increase in the nominal exchange rate.  The difficulties
inherent in complying with the above gives rise to the possibility of a significant
overvaluation of the domestic currency.
In the recent past, cases of significant and prolonged overvaluation of the domestic
currency have resulted from stabilization programs that resorted to the use of preannounced
     This issue was explored by Harberger (1985) in the context of analyzing Panama's fiscal and external2
debt situations.
     The word wages is used to refer to labor cost to the employer, i.e. including all costs associated to3
employing one worker, such as health and other insurance, paid leave, retirement fund, etc.
2
rates of devaluation, or of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor (Bruno, 1991; Corden
1990).  Such were the cases of Argentina and Chile in the late seventies and early eighties.
Of those two cases, the Chilean experience is the one that involved a true and lasting attempt
to liberalize international trade in the context of a significant and persistent overvaluation
resulting from the stabilization program (Corbo and Solimano, 1991; Agosín and Ffrench-
Davis, 1993).  However, a distinctive characteristic of both cases was that a devaluation was
feasible without a severe disruption of the economy.
In contrast, recent discussions on trade liberalization attempts by Panama, and the
current stabilization cum trade liberalization plan in Argentina under the convertibility law,
have brought attention back to the issue of attaining a real depreciation when the exchange
rate is fixed and cannot be devalued (i.e., a devaluation would require extraordinary
measures).2
This paper analyzes trade liberalization under a fixed exchange rate that cannot be
devalued, focusing on the long-run consequences of persistent overvaluation that may result
from such a process when there are restrictions in the labor market that make nominal wages
rigid downwards and firing very costly.   While the analysis is conducted for the case of a3
fixed exchange rate, its implications are also relevant for that of a domestic currency that
devalues at a rate lower than that needed to reach the equilibrium real exchange rate (erer)
required by the less protected economy.  Here, following Edwards (1989), the erer is defined
as:
"... that relative price of tradables to nontradables that, for given sustainable values of other
relevant variables --such as taxes, international prices, and technology-- results in the
simultaneous attainment of internal and external equilibrium.  Internal equilibrium means that
the nontradable goods market clears in the current period, and is expected to be in equilibrium
in future periods. ... External equilibrium, on the other hand, is attained when the intertemporal
budget constraint that states that the discounted sum of a country's current account has to be
equal to zero is satisfied.  In other words, external equilibrium means that the current account
balances (current and future) are compatible with long-run sustainable capital flows." (p. 16)
For analytical purposes, trade liberalization may be conceived as being carried out
for two different objectives that need not be pursued simultaneously.  The first objective is
to increase productivity growth through increased competition; the second is to significantly
alter the static allocation of resources.  The productivity growth effects of increased
competition may be attained by promoting exports (Keesing, 1967, 1979; Feder, 1982, 1986;
Wade, 1990; Kim, 1993) and/or by one or more minor reductions in used protection along
     Edwards (1993) provides a review of empirical studies on openness, trade liberalization and growth;4
also see Tybout (1992).  Agosín and Ffrench-Davis (1993) provide a review of Latin American experiences.
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time.   Each reduction in used protection would require a relatively small real depreciation,4
and consequently have a minor impact on resource allocation.  Instead, trade liberalization
aimed at attaining a profound change in the static allocation of resources will require
significant changes in relative prices and will have major consequences on productive
capacity.  In line with recent trade liberalization attempts in developing economies, in this
paper it is assumed that a major static reallocation of resources between the production of
traded and non-traded goods is an important objective of reducing the level and dispersion
of protection.  That objective, however, is not the subject of the paper.  Only the
consequences of pursuing it under a non-devaluable fixed exchange rate are analyzed.
According to the preceding definition of external equilibrium, analyzing the evolution
of the erer requires that trade and long-run sustainable capital flows be considered
simultaneously.  In this paper, the analysis will be conducted under the assumption that trade
liberalization takes place without affecting those long-run sustainable capital flows, which
will be only briefly brought into the analysis.
The following section presents the definition of the real exchange rate, used in section
3 to explore alternative sources of real depreciation.  The analysis is initially conducted under
the assumption that there are no rents, which are later incorporated in section 4.  Section 5
shows the potential for overvaluation that exists when significantly reducing used protection
in an economy with a fixed exchange rate, and the consequences of overvaluation on the
productive sectors are analyzed in section 6.  The conflicts resulting from simultaneous
attempts to liberalize foreign trade and stabilize the economy are briefly explored in section
7.  Finally, some conclusions are reached in section 8.
2. The real exchange rate                 
Following our definition of the erer, the real exchange rate (rer) may be defined as the actual
set of ratios of the domestic prices of traded to those of non-traded goods.  However, for
practical purposes, a more operational definition is required.  For example, it may be defined
as the ratio of a domestic (producer) price index for traded goods (p ) to one forwd
domestically produced goods (p )dd
rer = p  / p [1]wd dd
Although an index as in [1] will be appropriate for following the actual path of the
     Henceforth, world prices refer to prices expressed in the foreign currency to which the domestic5
currency is tied.
     In order to simplify the presentation, domestic export distribution costs have been omitted from the6
definition of the producer's price of the representative exported good.
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rer over time, the analysis of the allocative effects brought about by policy measures leading
to a more liberal trade regime requires a more detailed definition of the rer.  For example,
the numerator of [1] may be thought of as a weighted average of price indices for imported
and exported goods
        á p  + (1 ! á) pmd xd
rer = )))))))))))) [2]
          pdd
Consequently, [2] can be thought of as a weighted average of a real import and a real export
exchange rates
rer = á rmer + (1 ! á) rxer [3]
where rmer = p /p  and rxer = p /p .  More simply, the rer could also be conceived as amd dd xd dd
weighted average of the relative prices of representative imported and exported goods, with
respect to the representative domestically produced good.
The domestic (producer) price for the representative imported good (p ) results frommd
its border price p , assumed to be exogenous to the country, the nominal exchange rate e, andm
the ad valorem effect of import restrictions ô .   So, the domestic (producer's) price of them 5
imported good would be
p  = p  e (1 + ô ) [4]md m m
To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that in all cases the initial reduction in trade
restrictions implies a reduction in used protection.  Consequently, further changes in ô always
imply changes in used protection (i.e., no water remains in the tariff).
Similarly, the domestic (producer) price of the exported good will be
p  = p  e (1 ! ô ) [5]xd x x
where ô  is the ad valorem equivalent of export restrictions (an export subsidy will be ax
negative ô ).x 6
     For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that no exported goods enter directly or indirectly into the7
production of capital goods, and that there are no domestically produced capital goods that are exported at the
margin.
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The price of the representative non-traded good may be expressed as the sum of the
corresponding total requirements of traded inputs, wages, and operating surplus:
p  = L w + F  p  e (1 + ô ) + F  p  e (1 ! ô ) + s [6]dd m m mi x x xi
where L and F are the total, direct and indirect, unit labor and traded input requirements of
the non-traded good, respectively, w is the nominal wage, ô  and ô  are the ad valoremmi xi
effects of trade restrictions on imported and exported inputs, respectively, and s is the total
requirement of gross operating surplus.   From [4], [5], and [6], the real import and real
export exchange rates may be written as
p  e (1 + ô )m m
rmer = ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) [7]
          L w + F  p  e (1 + ô ) + F  p  e (1 ! ô ) + sm m mi x x xi
p  e (1 ! ô )x x
rxer = ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) [8]
         L w + F  p  e (1 + ô ) + F  p  e (1 ! ô ) + sm m mi x x xi
Finally, for purposes of the subsequent analysis, gross operating surplus s may be
thought of as
s = K(L , w, F , p , ô , F , p , ô , ñ) + R + ð [9]k mik mik mik k mk mk
where K(.) is reproducible capital cost (i.e., depreciation plus normal return to reproducible
capital), R represents rents (i.e., returns to non-reproducible capital, e.g. land), and ð is
excess profits.   Reproducible capital cost K(.), in turn, is a function of total requirements of7
labor and traded inputs needed to domestically produce capital goods, their prices, total
requirements of imported capital goods, their prices, and the market rate of return ñ.
3. Alternative ways of attaining a real depreciation
Measures to obtain the expected allocative benefits of a more liberal trade regime will
typically include the reduction of import restrictions ô  and export taxes ô , as well as them x
reduction of export subsidies (negative ô ) that may have been used to compensate for thex
anti-export bias of the protective trade regime.  While reductions in ô  will unambiguouslym
     This difficulty in ascertaining the effects on the foreign exchange market of changes in the rer defined8
as in equations [4] and [5], led Harberger (1986) to prefer the more traditional foreign exchange market
definition of rer = e p /p , where p  is an index of world prices.  However, the "domestic relative price ofw dd w
tradables" (Edwards, 1989) is more appropriate for the analysis of allocative effects.
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increase the demand for foreign exchange, the results of a reduction in the absolute value of
ô  are ambiguous, since the increase in the supply of foreign exchange resulting from lowerx
export taxes may override the effects of the reduction in export subsidies.  As a result, it is
conceivable, although unlikely, that a reduction in both ô  and ô  may not require a realm x
depreciation after trade taxes have been changed, i.e. it is unlikely that the increase in exports
brought about by the reduction in export taxes would be enough to compensate for the
increase in imports due to the reduction in tariffs and the decrease in exports originated in
the reduction of export subsidies.  Nevertheless, in this paper it is assumed that the increase
0 1in the equilibrium real exchange rate from erer(ô ) to erer(ô ) resulting from the reduction
0 1of trade restrictions from vector ô  to ô  will require for a real depreciation to take place after
all trade taxes and subsidies have been reduced.
Equations [7], [8], and [9] allow the analysis to focus on the different ways of
attaining the real depreciation required by trade liberalization measures (i.e., reductions in
ô  and ô ).  For a given e, p , and p , and excluding rents, that will be taken into account inm x m x
section 4, the real depreciation may originate in one or more of the following sources: i)
reductions in the domestic prices of traded inputs relative to those of other traded goods (a
reduction in ô  and ô  relative to ô  or ô , or an increase in ô  relative to ô  or ô ); ii) anmi mik m x xi m x
increase in export subsidies; iii) a reduction in gross operating surpluses; iv) a productivity
increase (reductions in labor or foreign exchange coefficients); v) a reduction in nominal
wages.
Reductions in the domestic prices of traded inputs relative to those of other traded
goods would increase the profitability of producing marginally traded final goods, leading
to an increase in the net supply of foreign exchange from export-producing activities and to
some reduction in net demand originating in import substitution of final goods.  These
reductions in the domestic prices of traded inputs would simultaneously lead to an increase
in the demand for foreign exchange, since these inputs are also used in the production of non-
traded goods.  The increase in the supply of foreign exchange originated in traded sectors
could be greater than that in the demand for traded inputs of non-traded goods, but the net
effect is likely to be small and associated with an increase in effective protection to
industries using these inputs.8
Moreover, under the protective trade regime tariffs on consumption goods are
7generally higher than those for intermediate goods.  As a result, a reduction in used
protection aimed at reducing the dispersion in effective protection rates is likely to have
reduced tariffs on inputs used in the production of intermediate and capital goods (ô  andmi
ô ) less than the average tariff rate (ô ), requiring a specific compensatory real depreciationmik m
effect from other sources.  Similar reasons rule out the possibility of resorting to increases
in taxes to marginally exported inputs (ô ).  In practice it is likely that, cornered by the realityxi
of persistent overvaluation of domestic currency, policy-makers will resort to increasing
effective protection for final goods as a desperate move to reduce the trade deficit.  However,
this paper will not consider such option since it would contradict the allocative objectives
of trade liberalization.
Increasing export subsidies with respect to the protected situation would run counter
to the proclaimed objectives for their instauration, as well as to the objectives of a trade
liberalization justified on allocative grounds.  If the reasons for instituting export incentives
included compensating for the anti-export bias of the trade regime, they are supposed to be
reduced when import restrictions are brought down while the rer increases for all traded
goods.  A static allocation of resources closer to that corresponding to free trade would also
require a reduction of export subsidies.  Nevertheless, maintaining the existing export
subsidies may be used as a means to reduce the appreciation resulting from tariff reductions,
and postpone part of the adjustment.  Export subsidies to be removed as other sources of real
depreciation develop, would act as a temporary cushion similar to a step by step approach
to tariff reduction.  In practice, an initial reduction or elimination of these subsidies may later
be followed by their increase or reinstatement in order to attain some (hidden) real
depreciation.  However, export subsidies would be difficult to finance under the fiscal
discipline imposed by the need to attain a real depreciation (Edwards, 1989).
Reductions in s (gross operating surplus) are likely to take place as firms scramble
for survival under greater competition and an overvalued domestic currency.  These
reductions, however, would be short-term and unlikely to be sustainable in the long run.
When rents are negligible, reductions in s that become sustainable in the long run !i.e., those
that do not result in the absence of net investment! are not to be expected but for the handful
of sectors that were able to translate the lack of competition into a higher than "normal"
profit rate.  In other words, only reductions in ð can be expected to be sustainable.
Consequently, it is likely that most of the real depreciation effect would have to come
from a reduction in nominal wages, an increase in productivity, or both.  In practice, if the
required real depreciation can take place along time without seriously hurting the economy,
it may be accomplished by nominal wages growing at a rate lower than that of international
     Investments in rent-intensive activities may be an exception (see section 6).  Another exception may be9
that of exported goods whose export taxes are reduced.  On the other hand, domestic producers of traded goods
that use the previously taxed exported goods as inputs would be hit hard.
     It is conceivable that the profitability effect on the production of traded goods of lower domestic prices10
of imported capital goods may exceed that of the overvaluation, but it is highly unlikely not only because the
overvaluation affects 100 percent of the value of the output and inputs of capital goods are only a fraction of
long-run marginal costs, but also because tariffs for capital goods tend to be among the lowest.
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prices p , by productivity growing at a rate higher than that of p , or both.  More precisely,w w
if from [1] and [6] we define the rer as
    p  e (1 + ô)w
rer = ))))))))))))))))) [10]
          L w + F p  e (1 + ô) + sw
then, for the rer to increase along time (rer > 0) when gross operating surpluses s and trade@
restrictions ô are assumed fixed, it is required that
[11]
iwhere the ß  are positive constants.  That is, growth in international prices for traded goods
has to be more than enough to compensate for growth in domestic wages net of the effect of
productivity increases.
Productivity increases may come from three main sources: investment in more
efficient techniques, greater operational efficiency, and higher intensity of work.  Investment
would only take place if foreseen by firms as profitable at the present cost to the employer,
w.  Consequently, very few investments in the production of exported goods would be made
unless dramatic productivity increases are foreseen as resulting from such investment.   The9
inconsistency between the lower protection level and the old unit labor cost will also deter
investment in activities that are expected to remain domestically produced, but become
marginally imported at the new protection level and its corresponding erer.  Very little
investment in the production of traded goods will take place unless a reduction in unit labor
costs originating in lower wages or higher productivity is attained and perceived as
sustainable.  This level of investment would most likely represent only a fraction of the
amount that would have been invested anyway in the without trade liberalization situation.10
While the overvaluation lasts, investments would be made primarily in the production
of non-traded goods.  Investment into the production of intermediate non-traded goods may
carry some real depreciation effect by increasing productivity (reducing prices of non-traded
     Corden (1992) seems more optimistic regarding the effects of substituting for non-traded inputs.11
     For a discussion and further references on the role of increasing operational efficiency, see Schwartz12
(1991).
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goods).  Such an effect would be the unintended by-product of producing for the domestic
market and may provide, along time, only a part of the real depreciation required, with minor
effects during the first years of the overvaluation.  More important, this productivity effect
does not substitute for the results on the production of non-traded goods of deliberate actions
prompted by competition in meeting the demand by producers of traded goods.
In summary, not only will investment taking place under an overvalued domestic
currency not be distributed among sectors as required to attain the new resource allocation
of the now more liberal trade regime, but it will do little to attain a real depreciation.  The
search for sources of real depreciation must be then in the direction of lower wages, greater
operational efficiency and higher intensity of work.
Some reduction in the cost of producing traded goods may be attained by substituting
traded for non-traded current inputs, now allowed by the trade liberalization.  However, the
net effect on the foreign exchange market generated by the substitution, and the associated
reduction in the real depreciation required by the trade liberalization, are likely to be minor
since: i) the potential reduction in the production cost of exports or import substitutes, is
attained through an increase in imports; and ii) substitution also takes place in the production
of non-traded goods generating an additional demand for foreign exchange.11
Greater operational efficiency may help some industries only if a small real
depreciation along a period of time is required.  However, increases in operational efficiency
are not reached overnight and may also require some investments, as well as changes in the
way plant work is performed (e.g., intensity and lay-out).  These changes may in turn conflict
with existing labor regulations, which were perceived as viable under the more protective
trade regime.12
The larger the real depreciation needed, and the shorter the period in which it has to
be attained, the more important lower wages and higher work intensity will become as the
main sources of real depreciation.  Resorting to these two sources may require changing (or
not enforcing) the prevailing rules that govern relations between labor and firms.  The new
relations should allow firms to lower nominal wages and reduce labor coefficients at a lower
firing cost, as well as to continue adjusting employment levels and labor costs to changes in
     Agacino et al. (1992, p. 55) suggest that total factor productivity increase in Chile's manufacturing13
industry during the 1975-81 period is explained primarily by "rationalization of the work process".  Romaguera
et al. (1994) show the effects on employment and real wages, and refer to enforcement and changes of labor
legislation.
     The reduction in the profitability of traded goods may temporarily bring down some rents in the14
production of non-traded inputs used in the production of those traded goods, a subject explored further in
section 6.
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international markets.   Thus, trade liberalization becomes an exercise in achieving a13
reduction in real wages in exchange for a promise of future real wage growth.
Unless preexisting rents provide some cushion, a more liberal trade regime requires
that domestic labor practices move closer to those of competitors in international markets in
order to lower unit labor costs as required by the new protection level.  For a given
productivity differential, the greater the reduction in used protection, the more stringent the
alignment of domestic labor practices will have to be.  This requirement, in turn, raises other
questions regarding: i) how close to the labor practices implicit in international prices is it
desirable to come; ii) when to start, and at what pace, the changes in labor practices relative
to the overall changes required for reducing the distance between domestic and international
productivity levels; and iii) since it is also likely that existing domestic entrepreneurial
practices do not respond to the competitive model, it should also be asked when to start, and
at what pace, the changes in labor practices relative to changes in the rules that govern
entrepreneurial behavior.
4. The existence of rents
If the trade liberalization manages to reduce rents entering the cost of domestically produced
goods, it may help in bringing about some real depreciation.  Rents are residual incomes
whose levels depend, for given productivity levels, on those of other prices and economic
activity.  Since both prices and activity levels are likely to be affected in the process, their
effects on bringing about the required real depreciation will be explored in this section.
A recession may be the eventual consequence of the overvaluation, initially forcing
the real depreciation by bringing down wages, rents, and, perhaps, profits in the production
of non-traded goods.  Rents may recuperate when (and if) the real depreciation finally takes
place and economic activity returns to normal levels.  The final level of those rents will
depend on the extent to which the resumption of growth under the new relative prices implies
growth for those rent-intensive non-traded products.   While rents will accompany the14
reduction in the prices of non-traded goods during the recession, in the end only the final
productivity and relative price effects of the liberalization may significantly affect the pattern
11
of rents (e.g., increasing rents in export-oriented sectors previously subject to export taxes,
or reducing rents in previously protected resource-intensive products).
From the perspective of relative price changes, and contrary to what may be required
in the long run, liberalizing trade with a fixed exchange rate is likely to initially translate into
a reduction in the domestic prices of traded goods.  These reductions in the prices of traded
goods may lead to reductions in rents that help in bringing down prices of domestically
produced goods.  For example, when the main source of rent is used in the production of
traded goods (e.g., agricultural land), and switching between traded and non-traded goods
can be done at a low cost (e.g., annual crops), the initial overvaluation would induce such a
switch, driving down domestic prices of non-traded goods and, consequently, rents.
However, since the reduction in the prices of non-traded goods would be attributable to the
overvaluation, it would be inherently temporary: the reduction would only last until the
fundamental sources of real depreciation have adjusted the rer to the new protection level.
There may also be short and long-run effects combined.  It is common for resource-
intensive exports to be taxed under the protectionist trade regime.  If, as expected, trade
liberalization translates into the reduction or elimination of those taxes, the short-run relative
price effect originating with these products would depend on the extent to which the
allocative effects of eliminating the export taxes will be temporarily compensated by the
overvaluation.  In the short run, this compensation would dampen the relative price effects
on the resource-intensive exports, as well as on those domestic producers, in many cases
exporters, that use as inputs the previously taxed resource-intensive exported products (e.g.,
agroindustries).  In the long run, the liberalization would lead to a significant increase in
these rents.
The case of reducing protection for resource-intensive products is similar.  Trade
liberalization would result in a reduction of rents for the owners of the previously protected
resources.  This reduction in rents would carry price effects for other domestic producers,
particularly if, as expected, resource-intensive products become marginally imported at the
new lower tariffs.  These are typical substitution effects of trade liberalization, already
referred to in section 3, that force production switches in the use of the natural resource, if
those switches are possible (e.g., agricultural land).  In this case, the long-run relative price
effect of the nominal price reduction will be magnified by the overvaluation in the short run,
and that extra relative price reduction will be eventually eliminated when the real
depreciation takes place.
From the above it appears that sustainable real depreciation effects originating in
relative price changes should only be expected from a reduction in rents of physical inputs
     The existence of high rents that provide a source for the income transfer facilitate such an institutional15
arrangement.
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(e.g., land and mineral deposits) when the liberalization reduces used protection for
domestically produced, resource-intensive products.  Instead, it may be argued that more
competition in the domestic market would help in reducing other types of rents (normally
associated with monopolistic or monopsonistic practices, bureaucracy, and corruption).
These cost reductions may improve international competitiveness by raising overall
productivity levels (like an overall increase in operational efficiency), thus increasing the
profitability of producing both traded and non-traded goods.  The productivity increase
would reduce the required real depreciation by increasing the profitability of traded sectors
for given prices of the non-traded inputs.  Competition effects may also contribute to the real
depreciation to the extent that they affect producers (reduce prices) of non-traded inputs.
Since both types of productivity effects would take some time to develop, and those effects
over producers on non-traded goods are largely not attributable to trade liberalization,
measures to increase domestic competition and discourage rent-seeking behavior should
precede trade liberalization.
5. The potential for a persistent overvaluation
Relations among economic agents take place according to rules that have been developed
taking into account the particular constraints created by the trade regime, as well as
incorporating the permissive elements that it allows.  In particular, trade regimes where
protection is in many cases prohibitive, converting many tradable products into non-traded
ones, have provided a fertile environment for powerful labor unions.  Those unions have
developed suitable instruments to bargain for higher wages and improved working
conditions, that translate into higher unit labor costs.   Many of those instruments have been15
incorporated into laws and regulations that govern the relations between labor unions and
firms.
In such an economic environment, trade liberalization attempts coupled with a fixed
nominal exchange rate, may create particularly conflictive situations when reductions in
nominal wages and other changes in labor regulations needed to reduce unit labor costs
become a necessary condition for attaining the real depreciation required.  The design of the
trade liberalization process should take into account the timing with which reductions in
     The extent to which traded goods are also wage-goods may play a role in the ability to attain lower16
nominal wages.  Price reductions of imported wage-goods originating in tariff reductions may facilitate
reductions in nominal wages, while the reduction of export taxes for the same type of goods may have the
opposite effect.
     Edwards (1984) analyzes the closely related subject of "the order of liberalizing the current and capital17
accounts of the balance of payments".  Also see Corden (1987), Michaely et al. (1991), and Agosín and
Ffrench-Davis (1993).
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labor costs can be attained.16
Moreover, while trade liberalization suddenly changes the rules for many producers
of now traded goods, rules would initially continue to be the same for the producers of non-
traded goods.  Thus, even when "labor reform" may have created the conditions for reducing
nominal wages, as long as activity levels remain in the normal range, the bulk of incentives
for translating the new conditions into actual wage reductions would be for the producers of
traded goods.
The reduction in used protection may require reductions in labor costs that prove to
be unattainable, because they are socially undesirable or politically unfeasible.  If that
becomes the case, the current account deficit will grow and eventually send the economy into
a balance of payments crisis (Edwards, 1988; Corden 1990).  If this crisis takes place after
only a brief period, there may be no major consequences to the productive sectors of the
economy, in the sense that the eventual real depreciation would take place soon enough to
allow traded sectors to recuperate.  However, if foreign capital inflows allow for the
financing of the current account deficit, and policy-makers decide to use those flows to
finance a stalemate with the labor unions, a prolonged overvaluation will result.   This17
ability of using capital inflows to finance the current account deficit generated by the real
appreciation, delays the precipitation of the recessionary adjustment, and thus the real
depreciation.
Capital inflows that finance a current account deficit generated by the overvaluation
should be differentiated from those that are "long-run sustainable" (referred to in the
definition of the erer), which may lead to reductions in the erer.  For example, if
liberalization of the capital account results in lower real interest rates, there may be an initial
reduction in the erer.  Lower interest rates, by means of making present consumption cheaper
relative to future consumption, may lead to an increase in the demand for, and consequently
the relative price of, non-traded goods (Edwards, 1989, sec. 2.5).  Also, capital inflows that
are invested in increasing the production of traded goods will result in an erer reduction.
Such a reduction only anticipates what will be later confirmed by the effects of these
investments in the structure of production.  The ensuing increase in the production of traded
     In Edwards (1989) terminology, the "real exchange rate 'fundamentals'".18
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goods will change the equilibrium relative prices between traded and non-traded goods.
What is significant about the preceding examples is that capital flows respond to changes in
the basic determinants of long-run equilibrium  that require a reduction in the erer to18
maintain it, instead of financing a temporary disequilibrium in the current account of the
balance of payments.
6. Consequences of an overvaluation
An important stated objective of recent trade liberalization attempts in developing countries
has been to attain a different allocation of resources.  The resource reallocation required by
the more liberal trade regime takes place mainly by changing the sectoral composition of
investment from previously non-traded to now traded sectors.  That change in composition,
in turn, is induced by changes in the relative profitability of investments arising from the
increase of the erer.  A higher erer will partially compensate for the lower import tariffs,
reducing the impact on marginally imported activities while increasing export revenues
relative to domestic costs.  An overvaluation of the domestic currency has the opposite effect.
On the one hand, the overvaluation implies domestic prices of imported goods below their
equilibrium levels (rer < erer) putting an extra burden on domestic producers of marginally
imported goods.  For many firms, that extra burden transforms what could have been
productivity-increasing incentives from more foreign competition into destructive effects on
production capacity.  On the other hand, the overvaluation lowers the profitability of
exported goods, making investment in those activities less attractive.
If foreign capital inflows are financing a trade deficit that results from the
overvaluation, investment will take place mostly in the production of non-traded goods.  The
combination of the overvaluation and the tariff reduction for capital goods may stimulate the
replacement of capital goods and some capacity expansion in non-traded activities, in
anticipation of the forthcoming devaluation.  A privatization program of non-tradable
activities conducted under these circumstances may also attract investors.  These events may
create the false impression that the trade liberalization policy is successful.  In fact, success
should be measured by the acquisition of capital goods for increasing the production of
traded goods.
Some investment in assets for the production of traded goods may take place when
there are sizable rents.  Since the market value of the asset that constitutes the source of rent
would be determined by the present value of the flow of that rent, reductions in international
     The consequences of running a persistent overvaluation when an economy has not yet completely19
recovered from a debt crisis, may be even more severe.
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rents that result from the overvaluation of the domestic currency will translate into price
reductions of those assets.  Those reductions will contribute to maintaining the profitability
of the investment, and open the possibility of sizable gains when the real depreciation finally
takes place.  The reduction in rents may also encourage some investment into the production
of traditional rent-intensive exported products (e.g., natural resource based goods).
If by the time foreign inflows eventually stop, the economy has not managed to
generate a trade surplus by reducing unit labor costs and attracting investment into the
production of traded goods, a capital flight would follow.  The country may no longer be able
to run a current account deficit and servicing of the foreign debt may have to be suspended.
That result, in turn, would require a deep and costly recession in order to reduce absorption,
force nominal wages downwards, restore the profitability of producing traded goods, and
start the reallocation of investment towards those activities.19
A persistent overvaluation may exhaust the ability of domestic firms producing
marginally traded goods to finance temporary losses, or to repay their debts contracted under
the expectation of higher long-run equilibrium profit margins.  Such an overvaluation may
also may make exporting firms come to ignore its temporary nature.  This change of attitude
will force them to abandon foreign markets where developing distribution networks, name
recognition, customer loyalty, and other "invisible assets" made them incur significant fixed
costs (Baldwin and Krugman, 1986) with a view towards a sustained flow of exports during
a long period of time.  Recuperation of those costs is made impossible during the
overvaluation.  These effects on the production of traded goods become particularly
important for small, as well as for newly exporting firms, whose future performance in
foreign markets is jeopardized by a misguided economic policy.
If nominal wages are inflexible downwards, at least for a prolonged period of time,
and/or other labor regulations affecting the ability of firms to increase operational efficiency
prove to be resilient, a destruction of capital may take place in activities that might have been
(or become) profitable under the long-run equilibrium prices corresponding to the new level
of protection.  In general, the lower the proportion of traded inputs, rents and capital costs
in the total value of a product in the "with trade liberalization situation", i.e. the higher the
participation of wages in total costs, the more vulnerable an activity becomes to an
overvaluation of the domestic currency (rer < erer).  These activities are likely to be more
affected by capital destruction since protective labor regulations prevent domestic producers
     In reviewing the Chilean experience, Agosín and Ffrench-Davis (1993) indicate that by 1992 the20
effects of the early trade liberalization with real appreciation manifested in exports "still concentrated in natural
resource-intensive product lines" (p. 50).
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from shifting the reduction in profits to labor.  The result will be increased political pressure
for "labor reform".  However, if those pressures cannot be translated into changes in laws and
regulations leading to the reduction in unit labor costs in a timely manner, those industries
would be the first ones to experience capital destruction, even though they might otherwise
have remained or become exporting activities.
The capital destruction effects of persistent overvaluation would be costly in
developing countries that have attained significant levels of industrialization.  In these
countries, too often capital destruction affects activities in which greater "learning by doing"
is expected, e.g. fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment, electronics.  Two
additional characteristics of these industries make their survival particularly vulnerable to the
combination of both the relative price and recessionary effects of the overvaluation: they are
relatively more income elastic (e.g., appliances) and even worse, very sensitive to investment
fluctuations (e.g., capital goods).
If the overvaluation of the domestic currency is long lasting, the later restoration of
equilibrium relative prices may not lead to the recuperation of these industries as the new,
lower protection levels may be insufficient to provide the production incentive required for
relearning.  As a result, the new composition of manufacturing output will have a higher total
content of rents and traded inputs, and a lower content of manufacturing value added than
it would have had, had trade liberalization taken place under an equilibrium real exchange
rate.   It may also lead, at least until the expected productivity effects materialize, to a lower20
average wage due to the disappearance of more skilled occupations.
7. Stabilization and trade liberalization
Bruno (1991) has suggested "... the wisdom of using the exchange rate as a key anchor in the
early stages of sharp stabilization but of moving in the direction of a more flexible exchange
rate once credibility has been developed."  However, the development of that credibility
would only be undermined by the simultaneous liberalization of the trade regime.  The level
of overvaluation that typically accompanies a stabilization program that uses the exchange
rate as a "nominal anchor" is significantly increased by reducing protection, because the erer
is higher for a more liberal trade regime.  That additional level of overvaluation reduces the
chances for success of the stabilization program by undermining confidence in the recently
17
acquired stabilization.  As time passes, the concern for a sizable devaluation to generate the
real depreciation required by the deficits in the current account of the balance of payments
becomes dominant for individuals' formation of expectations.
In economies with long inflationary records, for simultaneous price stabilization and
trade liberalization policies to be successful in attaining their targets, the fiscal restraint
required by the anti-inflationary policy would have to be successful in shrinking the domestic
market, precipitating and maintaining a recession.  The ensuing unemployment would create
the conditions for reducing wages and redefining the institutional arrangements between
labor and firms, reducing expectations for a resumption of inflation, and generating the
required real depreciation.  Initially, the effects of the overvaluation on the destruction of
production capacity would become difficult to discern from those of the stabilization induced
recession and from those of the greater foreign competition associated with trade
liberalization.  As a result, consequences of the overvaluation may be erroneously attributed
to stabilization or competition effects, and the incorrect diagnosis may prevent the adoption
of appropriate compensatory policies.  Nevertheless, these effects may last short if the
program is successful in driving nominal wages down and redefining relations between labor
and firms.
The key assumption in the above description is that the recession required to attain
both targets is politically manageable.  However, when the basic social conditions that
manifest themselves as inflation are well entrenched, the recession required for lasting
stabilization may be so deep that it is difficult to imagine a democratic government being
able to carry out such a policy.  In fact, not even non-democratic governments seem to have
been able to do it (Edwards, 1991).
When the conflict between the required consequences of pursuing both targets
simultaneously and political reality becomes apparent, the real appreciation becomes the
unavoidable consequence of the preeminence of price stabilization (Corbo, de Melo and
Tybout, 1986).  An expansionary price stabilization program financed by capital inflows
develops at the expense of the proclaimed allocative virtues of the more liberal trade regime
(Canitrot and Junco, 1993).  If the expansionary stabilization program is successful, it may
dominate in capturing the attention of the economic agents in the early stages of its
implementation, silencing the warnings about the production and trade effects of real
appreciation.  The increase in the equilibrium real exchange rate due to the reduction in
protection may be initially overlooked as a result of an incomplete analysis, or be obscured
by capital inflows, resulting in an underestimation of the extent of the overvaluation.  Policy
makers may also try to hide that incremental level of overvaluation fearing for its effects on
     That is Dornbusch's (1992, section 7.6) proposal for Argentina.  In his review of the Israel experience,21
Bruno (1991) described the multiple anchor approach followed in Israel, that included setting the anchors by a
negotiation in which the labor unions were involved.  However, the Israeli approach allowed for nominal
devaluations of an otherwise fixed exchange rate, a situation different from that of Argentina under the present
convertibility plan.
18
expectations, and betting on a real depreciation taking place before the precipitation of the
balance of payments crisis.  In the meanwhile, the perverse effects of real appreciation
described in section 6 would take place.  Moreover, if the program is not also successful in
removing the constraints for a real depreciation, it would make adjustment to the eventual
balance of payments crisis even more difficult.
The preceding arguments speak in favor of a sequence in which stabilizing the
economy precedes a trade liberalization attempt that pursues a significant reallocation of
resources.  The conditions required to attain stabilization may not be able to prevent an
overvaluation of the domestic currency that sends an economic signal contrary to that
required by trade liberalization.  The latter generates pressures to abandon the exchange rate
as a "nominal anchor" or, alternatively, if the government adheres strictly to attaining both
targets with a fixed exchange rate, a recession is required to drive nominal wages down and
redefine relations between labor and firms.21
8. Conclusions
A persistent overvaluation while liberalizing trade will make otherwise competitive firms
loose foreign markets, destroy otherwise productive capital, create a fertile ground for a debt
crisis, and lead to a future costly servicing of an easily acquired foreign debt.  Since imports
are likely to be more price elastic in the short run, there is a strong argument for an
undervalued domestic currency during the initial stages of trade liberalization.
If the nominal exchange rate is fixed and prices of non-traded products are inflexible
downwards, the level of protection should not initially be set lower than that allowed by the
unit labor costs determined by those labor policies already in place.  If an even more liberal
trade regime is desired, protection may be further reduced when: i) producers of marginally
exported goods have started to respond to price incentives; ii) producers of marginally
imported goods have adjusted to more (and different) competition; iii) measures to increase
domestic competition and discourage rent-seeking behavior are starting to have an effect; and
iv) more flexible nominal (and real) wages, and greater control by firms over working
conditions, would allow for a depreciation of the rer through higher productivity and lower
nominal wages.  Productivity increases stemming from investments in new techniques will
     For a synthesis of this subject in the context of a price determination model see Aukrust (1970, 1977)22
and the references cited therein.
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only attain a significant level when firms perceive that they know the relative prices that have
to be considered for their cash flow projections.
The path for attaining a more liberal trade regime should take the entrepreneurial
practices and the institutional arrangements between labor and firms as constraints, and only
when those constraints have been relaxed to the extent allowed by the current protection
level, should trade liberalization proceed.  Otherwise, significant costs in terms of
unemployment and destruction of capital will result.  The use of the rer as an instrument to
change the entrepreneurial practices, or to achieve a different institutional arrangement
between labor and firms, is very costly.  It is costly because it will eventually require a
recession to adjust the balance of payments, and because it will carry a sectoral bias against
traded sectors with long-lasting consequences on their productive capacity.
Once protection has reached its desired (or feasible) level, and an equilibrium rer has
been attained, for a given rate of profit equilibrium changes in labor costs will be determined
by changes in productivity relative to the rest of the world, and by changes in wages
(including benefits, as well as protection from occupational health risks) in competitor
countries expressed in the foreign currency to which the domestic currency is tied.
Consequently, institutional changes must have been put in place to ensure that labor
negotiations will take place according to rules compatible with maintaining an equilibrium
rer.  That requires specific consideration of potential disparities in the outcomes of labor
negotiations in non-traded sectors vs. those in traded sectors.22
The simultaneous implementation of stabilization and trade liberalization programs
are likely to complicate the implementation of both, because of the conflicting demands they
place on the exchange rate as a key economic signal: in the former case, as a determinant of
absolute prices; in the latter, as a determinant of relative prices.  While stabilization will
normally result in an overvaluation of the domestic currency relative to the erer for the more
protected economy, trade liberalization requires a real depreciation with respect to the same
reference value.  When the exchange rate is fixed, this conflict can only be resolved by
driving nominal, but sticky wages down, that in turn can only be attained at a high cost in
terms of employment and production capacity.  Stabilizing the economy should precede trade
liberalization if some of these costs are to be avoided.
20
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